Irak er Fucked Up Beyond All Recognition – FUBAR. Også mere end bare dér, hvor tilfældet Irak har været håndteret lidt uheldigt. Et sted mellem 60.000 og 600.000 civile irakere er blevet slået ihjel gennem de sidste 4 år; “lidt uheldigt” er da vist en eufemisme, der vil noget.
Og Saddam havde INGEN WMD. Zippo, zilch.
Og allehånde rapporter, der ifølge nogen frikender Bush-regeringen for al skyld, har mig bekendt faktisk aldrig svaret på dét spørgsmål, som Jakob Elkjær gentagne gange har bedt Fogh Rasmussen om at svare på, nemlig:
Er regeringen i besiddelse af nogen som helst skriftlig dokumentation eller udtalelser, der kan underbygge, at FN’s våbeninspektører den 21. marts 2003 kan tages til indtægt for udtalelsen, at “Irak har masseødelæggelsesvåben. Det er ikke noget, vi blot tror. Vi ved det. Irak har selv indrømmet, at de har haft sennepsgas, nervegas og miltbrand, men Saddam Hussein vil ikke afregne. Han vil ikke fortælle os, hvor og hvordan de våben er blevet destrueret”?
Nuvel, jeg ved udemærket godt, at Fogh Ramussen henholder sig til, at vi ikke gik i krig på grund af WMD, men på grund af krænkede FN-resolutioner; fint nok, hvis Fogh Rasmussen vil køre på med dét. Men det ændrer altså ikke et hak på, at Irak-krigen er USA’s/Bush’s krig, og at hele cirkuset blev solgt på truslen om, at Irak havde WMD.
Og hvad var det, dem som havde været i Irak op til krigen sagde?
Scott Ritter:
I bear personal witness through seven years as a chief weapons inspector in Iraq for the United Nations to both the scope of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and the effectiveness of the UN weapons inspectors in ultimately eliminating them.
While we were never able to provide 100 percent certainty regarding the disposition of Iraq’s proscribed weaponry, we did ascertain a 90-95 percent level of verified disarmament. This figure takes into account the destruction or dismantling of every major factory associated with prohibited weapons manufacture, all significant items of production equipment, and the majority of the weapons and agent produced by Iraq.
With the exception of mustard agent, all chemical agent produced by Iraq prior to 1990 would have degraded within five years (the jury is still out regarding Iraq’s VX nerve agent program – while inspectors have accounted for the laboratories, production equipment and most of the agent produced from 1990-91, major discrepancies in the Iraqi accounting preclude any final disposition at this time.)
The same holds true for biological agent, which would have been neutralized through natural processes within three years of manufacture. Effective monitoring inspections, fully implemented from 1994-1998 without any significant obstruction from Iraq, never once detected any evidence of retained proscribed activity or effort by Iraq to reconstitute that capability which had been eliminated through inspections.
In direct contrast to these findings, the Bush administration provides only speculation, failing to detail any factually based information to bolster its claims concerning Iraq’s continued possession of or ongoing efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. To date no one has held the Bush administration accountable for its unwillingness – or inability – to provide such evidence.
Hans Blix:
Inspections in Iraq resumed on 27 November 2002. In matters relating to process, notably prompt access to sites, we have faced relatively few difficulties and certainly much less than those that were faced by UNSCOM in the period 1991 to 1998. This may well be due to the strong outside pressure.
Some practical matters, which were not settled by the talks, Dr. ElBaradei and I had with the Iraqi side in Vienna prior to inspections or in resolution 1441 (2002), have been resolved at meetings, which we have had in Baghdad. Initial difficulties raised by the Iraqi side about helicopters and aerial surveillance planes operating in the no-fly zones were overcome. This is not to say that the operation of inspections is free from frictions, but at this juncture we are able to perform professional no-notice inspections all over Iraq and to increase aerial surveillance.
[...]
Let me conclude by telling you that UNMOVIC is currently drafting the work programme, which resolution 1284 (1999) requires us to submit this month. It will obviously contain our proposed list of key remaining disarmament tasks; it will describe the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification that the Council has asked us to implement; it will also describe the various subsystems which constitute the programme, e.g. for aerial surveillance, for information from governments and suppliers, for sampling, for the checking of road traffic, etc.
How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks? While cooperation can and is to be immediate, disarmament and at any rate the verification of it cannot be instant. Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude, induced by continued outside pressure, it would still take some time to verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant persons, and draw conclusions. It would not take years, nor weeks, but months. Neither governments nor inspectors would want disarmament inspection to go on forever. However, it must be remembered that in accordance with the governing resolutions, a sustained inspection and monitoring system is to remain in place after verified disarmament to give confidence and to strike an alarm, if signs were seen of the revival of any proscribed weapons programmes.
De “måneder”, Hans Blix bad om, kunne man så ikke vente på, fordi … ja, hvorfor?