Om Irak
Tuesday, February 28th, 2006Jeg snupper lige en kommentar fra J.D. Henderson på Intel Dump i fuld længde. Inden jeg gør det, vil jeg bare tilføje, at mens balladen om Mohammed-tegningerne dybest set ikke handler om et par tegninger i en dansk avis, som ingen have hørt om før midt-januar i år, så gør de forhold, Henderson skriver om i kommentaren, ikke tingene bedre.
Sheerahkahn, it is true that to win we must put our young men in the mud just as the Roman legions did, but heavily armed drones might allow more manpower and resources to be used in that mud, satcom allows those men (and drones) to be in the right place at the right time, etc. The “assisting” is the difference between winning and losing. We have the technological edge, and even if advanced weaponry won’t help in Iraq, it will help if we fight a major power. If we mix it up with China, or Japan, or France, or Argentina (just to point out we don’t know who will be our likely foes in 25 years) then it will be a matter of national survival. I am not for putting all the eggs in our Iraq basket. The QDR should be a tool to ensure we are ready for what we are facing now AND what comes next.
Of course, as you and others point out, it seems to do neither, or only “what comes next” and doesn’t seem to give any support for what we face now.
Rummy said that you go to war with the Army that you have, not the one you wish you had. That said, we have been on the ground inside Iraq, fighting, for two years 11 months – it took less than four to fight and win world war two. Geez, I am pretty sure we didn’t invade Europe and destroy the Empire of Japan with the Army we had in Dec. 1941, and sure as hell not the Army we had in 1940. In 1940 we had an Army the size of Luxembourg’s military, using WWI rifles or WOODEN STICKS for training, and three years later we had one of the best equipped, best trained, and largest militaries in the history of the world – and by 1945 we had 8 million men under arms and had equipped not only our military, but much of the rest of the world, with the some of the best equipment in the world.
But our soldiers still don’t have what they need. No, I am not talking about equipment. I am not talking about body armor or up-armored humvees or stuff like that. We are missing the most important element for victory – a winning strategy. We had that before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Almost three years in to this war and we still haven’t done the hard work of sitting down and figuring out where we are, where we want to be, how to get there, and then communicate that to the American people. Three f’ing years and even today just questioning the lack of a plan is called “comforting the enemy” or “harms the morale of the troops.”
The QDR is a way to communicate to the American people what it will take to win in Iraq. Instead we got a dream sheet of overpriced boondoggles, a cut in troop strength, and the insane belief that even after all this time a few more special forces and civil affairs soldiers can win it on the cheap – even if they don’t speak Arabic.
If we were serious about winning this war we would take the time and the money to give each soldier training in Arabic language and culture, and specifically Iraqi history. We would add weeks of training to initial entry training, but make it Iraq-specific. It would take billions of dollars and make our manpower shortages greater in the short-term, but it is what it will take to win in Iraq. Instead we see only multi-billion dollar weapons that will make contractors rich.
I think we can win in Iraq. We must. The inaptly-named “insurgency” is actually the former rulers of Iraq trying to reassert themselves and take over again. It is the powers-that-were, not some “insurgency” or Islamic fundamentalist movement. We are still fighting Saddam’s military, not Al Queda. And it looks as if we are going to let Saddam’s guys win, all because the administration refuses to admit the truth, even to itself. Every time we call them “terrorists” or “insurgents” it HELPS THEM. They (the Baathists) are not liked by most Iraqis, including Sunnis and Shias and Kurds. They want to try and make Iraq so violent and unpleasant that people prefer the “good old days” of Baathist terror. At least it was predictable, it wasn’t chaotic. The Baathists also want to convince the Iraqi people that all the bad parts of Saddam’s regime are in the past, and this is a war for liberation/Islam/Iraqi nationalism. So what do we keep doing? Calling them insurgents, kicking in doors and conducting house to house searches, and putting American soldiers who have little cultural or language training, but are armed and outnumbered and afraid, in Saddam’s former palaces, only to be seen when they walk or roll by on full alert, scanning every Iraqi face with trepidation. We have physical and sexual abuse of Iraqi prisoners, and we punish privates instead of generals and hope the Iraqis “get over it.” We pretend not to notice the deliberate attempts by the Baathists to foment civil war. We pretend that Iran isn’t benefiting greatly at our – and the Iraqi people’s – expense. We might be fighting with the Army we have instead of the Army we want, but we are fighting the war we want instead of the war we have.
And after all this, there are still many Iraqis that don’t want the Baathists back. We should understand that they don’t want to help us – and we shouldn’t expect them to. It is their country, not ours, and if they benefit by killing us then it makes sense for them to kill us. If they help us it is because it benefits them, not because they secretly yearn to be Americans and Americans are always the good guys. They aren’t helping us, they are helping themselves. There are many Iraqis who are willing to stand up for the current Iraqi government, who want a democracy in Iraq, or at least, don’t want the Baathists back. We have pledged our sacred honor to help them. Now we should do it. And we should not only promise, but show in our actions, that we have no intention of staying once order is restored. We should also not only promise, but show in our actions, that we do not intend to leave until order is restored and our Baathist enemies are vanquished. Instead we call the Baathists insurgents and terrorists and call Iraq “the central front in the war on terror.” Iraqis aren’t stupid. They know that is bullshit. They know the only reason terrorists are able to attack us in Iraq is because it benefits the Baathists every time they are called terrorists.
And what do we do? We have a QDR that doesn’t even address the issues behind what it will take to win in Iraq. We have no emphasis on language or cultural training or Iraqi history – especially a factual, honest look at the barbaric history of colonialism there. Sure, we train 300 soldiers here, 50 officers are taught Arabic there, but that is not the kind of program I mean. I mean 100,000 soldiers trained to speak Arabic fluently, 500,000 more who have less extensive – but still intense -language training and cultural training, and all soldiers (ALL) to recieve at least three weeks of an “Iraq” cram session so that they know WHY they shouldn’t call Iraqis “hajis,” so each and every commander knows why kicking in doors, even when it must be done, is a step in the direction of losing this war, so each and every soldier knows WHY we must give up our palaces and move out of our fortified bases and back into Iraq, amongst the people – even when our casualties will initially skyrocket. You can’t win a war by sitting in a bunker – doesn’t matter what kind of war it is. This training will cost billions and billions of dollars, and it won’t help us do anything other than win in Iraq. It will be cheaper in the long run, but more expensive in the short term – and it is clear that this administration thinks only in short terms. It won’t help us fight the Chinese, or the Canadians, or anybody. It will only help us win in Iraq. And there is not much in the QDR that will help us win in Iraq. Why? Because we don’t give a damn. We didn’t have a plan for success in March 2003 (which the Army knew and tried to raise hell about, but after Shinseki was fired and the Iraqi military collapsed the wise counsel of our senior military leaders was ignored). We don’t have a plan for success now. We have only a plan to not pull out now – but yeah, maybe later. What a plan.
So we are apparently going to “stay the course.” It is a successful strategy – if your goal is not to win in Iraq, but instead not to lose during this administration and set it up so that when we do lose you blame the critics instead of yourself. Pretty smart strategy, actually. Vietnamization worked incredibly well – not for the Vietnamese or America, of course, but for those who crafted that policy of defeat.
Den oprindelige post er her – og handler om USAs firårige gennemgang af dets militær, The Quadrennial Defence Review.





